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Abstract: Some regulatory reforms do not change just a specific signal that can be represented by a 
quantitative continuous variable, such as a tax rate, a price cap, or an emission threshold. The standard 
theory of reform in applied welfare economics (going back to contributions by e.g. Ramsey, Samuelson and 
Guesnerie) asks the question: What is the marginal effect on social welfare of changing a policy signal? 
However, reforms such as privatization, unbundling or liberalization of network industries are often 
described by ‘packages’ shifting a policy framework. It is increasingly frequent in the empirical evaluation 
of such reforms to use categorical variables, often in polytomous form, for instance describing unbundling 
steps (vertical integration, accounting, functional, legal, ownership separation) on a discrete numerical scale, 
such as those proposed by the OECD and other international bodies. We review recent econometric literature 
evaluating regulatory reforms using such variables (40 papers) and we discuss some methodological issues 
arising in this context. 
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Regulatory policy is often seen as one of the lever that policy makers can use to influence the 
welfare of a country (OECD, 2010). The evaluation of regulatory reforms may seem 
straightforward: governments should adopt only those that bring about social welfare 
improvements. This implies that desirable reforms must yield economic and social benefits that 
outweigh their costs (Coglianese, 2012). This seemingly simple description of the assessment of 
policy reforms is backed-up by a vast and well-established literature in public economics (e.g. 
Ramsey, 1927; Samuelson, 1986; Guesnerie, 1977; Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971; Drèze and Stern, 
1990). See Boadway (2012) for a survey. 
Although theoretical models in this strand of the literature, or those developed for the Cost 
Benefit Analysis (CBA) of policies, are often mathematically and informationally complex, their 
conceptual structure is quite simple (Guesnerie, 1998 and Florio, 2014). In models belonging to the 
“Ramsey-Samuelson-Guesnerie” tradition (RSG, henceforth), a reform can be though as a change 
to a vector of “signals”, defined as variables affecting the behavior and welfare of individuals and 
firms, such as prices, rations, taxes, transfers and shareholding rights (Drèze and Stern, 1990). 
In this framework one needs to model the functional relations linking government 
objectives, signals, constraints and private agents’ reactions. The aim is to approximate how the 
social welfare function changes in response to a marginal change in the vector of signals controlled 
by the government. 
Unfortunately, from the standpoint of an applied economist wishing to provide an empirical 
evaluation of reforms, the RSG modeling approach is not without problems. Its main shortcoming is 
that “a marginal change in the vector of signals” is frequently an inaccurate way of describing 
actual policy reforms. In fact, reforms do not necessarily involve an immediate change of signals, 
such as tax rates or regulated prices, nor an instantaneous variation in the social welfare function.  
On the contrary, regulatory reforms are typically implemented with legislative packages that 
encompass a variety of instruments such as: primary laws, secondary regulations, subordinate rules, 
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standards, administrative guidance and circulars (OECD, 2010). For instance, in the case of the 
European Union (EU), regulation of network services involves the adoption of both legislative and 
non-legislative acts, the so-called soft law (Maresca, 2013),
1
 with complex implementation 
mechanisms (Goldberg, 1976). Moreover, the aim of such tools and procedures is often not to 
induce an immediate change in a signal, but rather to provide mechanisms that, under certain 
circumstances, should pave the way for such a change. 
A case in point is the regulation of segments of the telecom industry. For instance, “local 
loop unbundling” in European member states gives the right to entrants to use the incumbent 
telecom operator’s local broadband network to offer their services directly to customers.2 Clearly, 
the implementation of such a legislation cannot be described as a change in the vector of signals 
(Guthrie, 2006 and Nardotto et al., 2015). Rather, local loop unbundling can be interpreted as a 
modification of the regulatory policy framework that is expected to create the conditions for a 
change in signals and is thus not well approximated as a problem belonging to the RSG tradition. 
We discuss the empirical assessment of “packages” or reforms of policy framework (PFR) 
and focus on network industries, given the pervasiveness of the economic services they provide 
(e.g. energy, water, telecommunications, transport). The aim is to provide a consistent analytical 
scheme to help researchers and policy makers avoiding methodological pitfalls and interpretational 
errors that might bias the evaluation of reforms when the RSG approach is neither applicable, nor 
appropriate. We show that, notwithstanding the analysis of PFR cannot rely on well-established 
theoretical foundations, such as the RSG approach, empirical analyses are feasible and necessary, 
albeit interpretation of results and therefore design of policy recommendations requires caution. 
                                                          
1
 Legislative acts (secondary law) comprise directives, regulations and decisions. Non-legislative acts include 
communications, green papers, and white papers. These so-called “soft laws” provide a correct interpretation of the 
primary and secondary laws. See Maresca (2013) and references therein. 
2
 See Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on 
unbundled access to the local loop. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the conceptual framework, 
definitions and mentions examples of policy categorical variables issued by the OECD (the ETCR 
database) and by the Quality of Government Institute (a websiteportal collecting a large number of 
indexes for many countries and years). Section 3 after proposing a prototype econometric model, 
reviews some recent econometric literature using polytomous or binary regulatory reform variables 
(40 papers). Section 4 discusses potential pitfalls and methodological issues in the above literature. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Conceptual framework 
2.1 What are PFR in practice? 
Although within the RSG tradition reforms are described as the marginal change of a vector of 
signals and evaluated by assessing their impact on the social welfare function, they can take a rather 
different shape. Let us consider the case of a government that approves a privatization bill as a 
broad framework to progressively give up control of several State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to 
private investors. 
To properly analyze these events, one should focus not only on microeconomic facts, such 
as the transfer of shares’ ownership of some SOEs, nor search for ultimate macroeconomic changes. 
In fact, privatization of SOEs, unbundling of network services, or access regulation are definitions 
of sets of policies aimed at inducing a change in the current economic environment and possibly 
affecting private agent’s utility. Hence, these measures are better described as “mesoeconomic” 
changes (see Ng, 1992): they aim at changing the institutional setting and hence to induce a variety 
of economy-wide effects in a certain direction. 
In some cases, PFR are accompanied by an even more comprehensive change: a policy 
paradigm shift, defined as a complete modification of the usual and accepted way of doing or 
thinking about something, such as the theory supporting the government’s policy action. Since 
paradigm shifts are hard to be quantitatively assessed and are best suited for interdisciplinary 
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analyses involving history and political science, they will not be discussed in what follows. On the 
contrary, we focus on mesoeconomic changes induced by PFR showing that they can be the topic of 
empirical analyses, albeit with due caution. 
Up to now, we have defined PFR mostly relying on exclusion criteria. In fact, we have used 
the term PFR to identify legislative or regulatory packages that are not necessarily translated into a 
change in the vector of signals, that do not automatically and directly affect private agents’ utility 
function and that cannot be analyzed within the RSG analytical framework. In the economic 
literature, such reforms are often associated with the list of measures included in the Washington 
Consensus (Williamson, 1994). However, the ten policy desiderata of Williamson (1994) do not 
exhaustively represent a range of measures that can be put under the PFR header. Acemoglu et al. 
(2008) list several measures that can be defined as PFR such as: opening to trade, financial 
liberalization, judicial reform, privatization of state enterprises, reduction of entry barriers, tax 
reform, removal of targeted industrial subsidies, and central bank independence. 
Since providing a complete list of policies that represent PFR is neither feasible, nor 
particularly informative, in this paper we equate PFR with the OECD’s (2012, p. 5) definition of 
regulatory policy, namely: “regulatory policy is about achieving government's objectives through 
the use of regulations, laws, and other instruments to deliver better economic and social outcomes 
and thus enhance the life of citizens and business.”3 This definition is similar to the RSG 
framework, but departs from it as it assumes a certain degree of complexity that cannot be captured 
by a unique signal. 
 
2.2 How are policy framework reforms measured? 
When interpreting reforms within the RSG framework, empirical analyses require identifying a 
change of signal, such as a tax-rate, a price, an interest-rate or an exchange-rate. In these cases, 
                                                          
3
 See: http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/ (last accessed: January 2017). 
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since most of the proxies of signals have natural unit of measurement, the main issue for the analyst 
is to search for the appropriate variable. 
On the contrary, to quantitatively assess the effects of PFR one needs to create or, resort to 
existing artificial indicator variables that have no natural units of measurement. Two leading 
examples of the PFR proxies are: 
1. The OECD indicators of Energy, Transport and Communications Regulation (ETCR). 
2. Indices of the quality of institutions (see e.g.: http://qog.pol.gu.se/). 
 
The ETCR database. The ETCR dataset provides information about regulatory structures and 
policies for OECD and some non-OECD countries. Information is collected with a questionnaire 
sent to the government of each country and complemented with publicly available data to create 
annual time series starting in the mid-1970s. Questionnaires are made of closed questions that can 
either be answered with numerical values (e.g. what is the market share of the largest company in 
the sector?), or by selecting from a set of pre-specified answers (e.g. a question that can be 
answered with “yes” or “no”, such as: “is unbundling of the local loop required?”). Qualitative 
information is coded into quantitative measures and then all answers are normalized in a range from 
zero to six, where values near zero indicate fewer restrictions to competition.
4
 See Koske et al. 
(2015). 
As shown in Figure 1 the ETCR index aggregates with equal weights indices for seven 
network sectors: telecom, electricity, gas post, air transport, rail transport, and road transport. For 
each sector, there are up to four sub-indices that cover different dimensions of the reforms: entry 
regulation, public ownership, vertical integration and market regulation. One of the strength of the 
ETCR database is that indicators are available for a very long time span, making it suitable for 
                                                          
4
 Consider the question: “What is the market share of the largest company in the sector?” The methodology assigns a 
score of zero if the share is smaller than 50%, three if it is between 50% and 90% and six if it is greater than 90%. 
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panel data analysis, see Figure 2. The ETCR indices have been used as proxies of PFR by several 
authors. See Tables 1-3. 
 
Quality of institutions. The Quality of Government Institute maintains a dataset aimed at measuring 
the trustworthiness, reliability, impartiality and the level of corruption of the public administration 
and the judicial system in the United Nations member states. There are many categories, including: 
quality of government (i.e. measures of impartiality, bureaucratic quality, corruption), judicial and 
labor market indicators, indices of the freedom of the media, and economic indicators measuring 
the involvement of the government in the economy. This kind of data are used in PFR literature (see 
e.g. Borghi et al. 2016, Polemis and Stengos 2017), as well as in political economy studies (see e.g. 
Obinger et al. 2016). 
 
This list of empirical PFR proxies is clearly not exhaustive, but it is representative of the approach 
often used in applied welfare economics.
5
 In fact, most of the PFR proxies have two features in 
common: they are compiled by transforming quantitative and qualitative information into 
normalized scores and are aggregated with a bottom-up approach. If score assignment and 
aggregation is meaningful and consistent through time and space (e.g. across countries), one could 
track the effects and intensity of reforms as illustrated in Figure 2. However, building such scoring 
systems and aggregating them with bottom-up approaches involves several methodological and 
interpretational issues that are the core topics of the following sections. 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Other indicators with similar characteristics include: the set of Global Competitiveness indices compiled by the World 
Economic Forum (2015) and many other used, or directly compiled, by scholars for their analyses (see e.g Erdogdu, 
2011a; Prati et al., 2013; Koo et al., 2013; Grajek and Röller, 2012; Howard and Mazaheri, 2009). See also Tables 1-3. 
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3. The econometrics of policy framework reforms 
Empirical analyses can be divided into two distinct groups, depending on whether the PFR proxy 
enters the econometric specification as dependent or as explanatory variable.
6
 The first class of 
models, with PFR as dependent variable, is representative of the political economy literature on the 
historical determinants, success and failure of reforms surveyed by Obinger et al. (2016). 
On the contrary, here we focus on models where the PFR proxies enter as explanatory 
variables. In these analyses, the outcome variable approximates the welfare change, that indirectly 
reveals the belief of the analyst about the social welfare function. Oft-used dependent variables 
include consumer or producer prices, productivity, quantity and quality of a service. Relying on 
such variables is sensible, if the assumptions linking the selected dependent variable with the latent 
“welfare change” are discussed before policy recommendations are formulated. 
Consumer prices are the most straightforward and important signal for a welfare analysis 
(Price and Hancock, 1998 and Florio, 2013). Although less orthodox, an alternative approach is to 
rely on consumers’ satisfaction surveys to measure perceived welfare changes (see Clifton et al., 
2014 and Fiorio and Florio, 2011 among others). However, as shown in Table 2, many alternative 
outcome variables that proxy the quality of the services have also been used. 
 
3.1 A prototypical econometric model for PFR evaluation 
Variables that are typically used as regressors in the evaluation of PFR can be denoted as: xi,t = 
[x(1)i,t, x(1)i,t-j, yi,t-k ], where x(1)i,t  [ PFRi,t, Di,t, Si,t, Zi,t,] for j, k >0. PFRi,t is a set of proxies for the 
                                                          
6
 Here we focus on standard reduced-form regression models. An alternative, is to rely the so-called potential outcome 
model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). In this setting, the focus is on the average change that a treatment (i.e. a PFR) 
induces on a given outcome variable. Since the “change” is computed by comparing the outcome for treated and non-
treated statistical units, the empirical analysis has to rely on counterfactuals (i.e. how the outcome of an average 
untreated unit would change if it were to receive the treatment). See Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for a review of the 
econometrics of program evaluation. 
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PFR, Di,t are demand-side controls, Si,t are supply-side controls, and Zi,t includes deterministic 
regressors (e.g. time trend, individual and time effects) and additional controls (e.g. firm 
characteristics). Notice that x(1)i,t might also include polynomial transformations and interaction 
terms. From now on, for ease of notation, we drop the subscripts that index statistical units and 
time, but we recall that GLM can be applied to cross-sectional, time-series or panel data.
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Demand-side controls (D) directly impact on most outcome variables. When y is the price of 
a good or service, natural candidates are the prices of its substitutes and per-capita income. Supply-
side drivers (S) proxy the change in unit costs, that in turn are correlated with input prices (e.g. in 
the case of electricity production, natural gas, coal, nuclear, hydro, solar, wind), and in the longer-
run also with technological shifts. Thus the choice of the elements in S hinges on the analyst’s 
knowledge of the technological features of the market under scrutiny. 
Lastly, Z collects all the remaining controls, including deterministic regressors (time and 
individual fixed effects, seasonal dummies, linear and polynomial trend terms) and other observable 
characteristics (e.g. gender, location, being a listed company). 
We can cast many of the empirical specifications used in the literature of PFR evaluation in 
the class of generalized linear models (GLM): 
g(E(y | x)) = x′y  LEF (1) 
where y is the outcome of interest, that can be a cross-sectional, time-series or panel 
variable, x denotes the set of explanatory variables that includes also the PFR proxy,  is the vector 
of unknown parameters, g(.) is called link function and LEF indicates a density belonging to linear 
                                                          
7
 We point out that the notation is somehow simplistic; in fact, we use x(1)i,t-j to indicate that the model can include lags 
(not necessarily in the same number and order) of all or only some of the variables in x(1)i,t. Moreover, notice that 
subscripts and the variables entering the set of regressors should be adjusted according to the nature of the dataset and 
depending on the empirical specification. For instance, a static panel model would exclude yi,t-k. 
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exponential family. Examples of LEF densities are the Bernoulli for binary data, the Poisson and 
negative binomial for count data, and the Normal for continuous data (Gourieroux et al., 1984). 
Combining different link functions and LEF densities yields a wide array of models 
(McCullagh and Nelder, 1989). For illustrative purposes, let   E(y | x) and   g(). The role of 
the link function g(.) is to map E(y | x) to  = x′. When g(.) is the identity function  = ; 
moreover, if y is a continuous normally distributed variable, such as (the log of) the electricity price, 
we get the linear regression model: E(y | x) = x′. If y is a binary variable with Bernoulli 
distribution, such as consumers’ satisfaction (e.g. y = 1 corresponds to “satisfied”, y = 0 means “not 
satisfied”), we can obtain both the Probit and the Logit models.8 Therefore, as it can be seen from 
Tables 1-3, the GLM approach encompasses all the specifications commonly used in the 
econometric literature of PFR evaluation in network industries. 
 
3.2 PFR in network industries: a short review  
We briefly discuss some of the contributions that have dealt with the empirical assessment of PFR 
in network industries. Most of the selected studies relies on panel data, while a minority focuses 
only on the time series (Bacchiocchi et al. 2005, 2008) or cross-section dimension (Fiorio et al. 
2013 and Nardotto 2015). A summary is shown  in Tables 1-3. 
Two classes of models have been used. Linear models, when the dependent variable is 
continuous, such as log-prices, log-productivity and GDP growth (e.g. Hyland 2016; Borghi et al. 
2016, Prati et al. 2013). Models for limited dependent variables, when the outcome variable is a 
dummy, such as consumers’ satisfaction or energy deprivation (Fiorio and Florio 2011, Fiorio et al. 
                                                          
8
 Both the Probit and Logit models are conditional probability models of the form, Pr(yit = 1 | xit) = h(xit′), where h(.) is 
a function that ensures that the Pr(.) is a well-defined probability. The Logit model is obtained when g(.) is the logit 
function, such that  = ln[/ (1 - )] and E(y | x) = exp(x′) / [1+ exp(x′)]. The Probit model is obtained when g(.) is 
the inverse of the standard Normal cumulative distribution function (cdf). Then  = -1() and E(y | x) = (x′), where 
 is the standard Normal cdf. 
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2013, Florio and Poggi, 2010). Although the GLM framework subsumes both approaches and can 
be applied to any data structure, for the sake of brevity, here we focus on panel data and discuss 
only linear models. Some assumptions and results used in the analysis of linear specifications are 
easily extended to models for limited dependent variables. See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for 
details. Moreover, we notice that implementation of both linear and limited depended variables 
models requires the analyst to make two choices: first, how to model the heterogeneity of statistical 
units and, second, between static or dynamic specifications. 
Using Equation (1) under the assumption that the link function g(.) is the identity function 
and that the outcome variable is normally distributed, we get a linear one-way error component 
model for panel data: 
                                                               yit =  + xit′ + uit             for i = 1,…, N; t = 1,…,T (2) 
uit = i + it (3) 
where, uit is the error term, i is the unobservable individual-specific effect that accounts for 
the heterogeneity among statistical units, it is the remainder disturbance. 
The model in (2) and (3) encompasses most of the linear panel data specifications in the 
analyses shown in Tables 1-3. Either fixed or random effects are used to account for the 
heterogeneity among statistical units. Unobservable individual-specific effects, i, are assumed to 
be fixed parameters to be estimated in the fixed effects (FE) model. The FE model is appropriate 
when the aim is to focus on a specific set of statistical units, say N countries, and inferences are 
conditional on those N units. The FE model is thus a conditional analysis: it delivers consistent 
estimates of the effects of PFR on the outcome variable conditional on the individual-fixed effects 
i and makes prediction feasible only for the N units in the sample. 
In the random effects (RE) model unobservable individual-specific effects, i, are assumed 
to be a stochastic variable. The RE model is appropriate when N statistical units have been 
randomly drawn from a large population and those N units are a representative sample of the 
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underlying population. A case in point is the analysis of household survey data. The RE 
specification is an example of marginal or population-weighted analysis: inferences pertain to the 
population from which the sample has been drawn and prediction is also feasible for units outside 
the sample. 
In the FE model the individual-effects, i, are potentially correlated with the observed 
regressors xit. On the contrary, the consistency of estimates in the RE model depends on the 
assumption that i are distributed independently from xit. We can see that Tables 1-3 display more 
FE than RE models: in fact, this stronger condition is often untenable in the evaluation of PFR. 
We now turn to the choice between static and dynamic specifications. Since most economic 
relations are not static in nature, dynamic specifications are often a natural choice and are 
implemented in 20 out of 40 surveyed studies. In panel data models there are two sources of 
correlation over time. The first, due to unobserved heterogeneity, arises because of the observation 
of the same individual over multiple time periods. The second, true state dependence, occurs when 
correlation over time is due to the causal mechanism explaining the fact that yit is determined by yit-j 
for j > 0. The unobserved heterogeneity explanation implies that the correlation over time is 
constant. This is clearly restrictive when an unobserved shock this period will affect the behavioural 
relationship for some periods and whose effect is not constant over time. An example are models 
describing prices or investment decisions (e.g. Brau et al. 2005, Alesina et al. 2005). 
In such cases, some dynamics can be introduced using a distributed lag structure for the 
explanatory variables of interest, including the lagged dependent variable among the regressors (e.g. 
Fiorio and Florio, 2013), or capturing serial correlation assuming an autoregressive process for the 
error term of the model, it, (e.g. Howard and Mazaheri, 2009). Neglecting the effect of lagged 
dependent variables or, more generally the presence of serial correlation, may distort inferences and 




Prices. Having discussed the methodology, we now organize the discussion around the nature of the 
outcome variable. Being the most important signal for welfare analysis the main strand of the 
literature focuses either on end-users or on wholesale prices. Empirical evidence on the impact of 
reforms on prices is mixed, largely depending on the characteristics of the countries where they are 
implemented. See Table 1. 
As far as the electricity sector is concerned, Bacchiocchi et al. (2015) show that 
liberalizations are associated with lower electricity prices for the EU15 countries, but with higher 
prices in New Member States. However, according to Hyland (2016), after controlling for the 
possible endogeneity of reforms, that arises because prices might be a push factor for reforms, 
market restructuring does not impact on wholesale electricity prices in EU27. Focusing on 
developing countries, Nagayama (2007, 2009) shows that, contrarily to expectations, liberalizations 
are associated with industrial and residential electricity prices increases (Nagayama, 2009). 
Moreover, while single regulatory reforms are not associated with significant price changes, the 
coexistence of an independent regulator and unbundling tends to correlate with lower prices, but it 
is not possible to identify a common pattern across countries (Nagayama, 2007). Similarly, the 
analysis carried out by Erdogdu (2011b) on a sample of 62 countries suggests that the sign and 
magnitude of the association between different reform steps and electricity price-cost margin varies 
greatly across countries. Fiorio and Florio (2013) focus specifically on changes in corporate 
ownership implementing a variety of static and dynamic panel data model. They show that while 
the impact of liberalisation on prices is small and uncertain, public ownership is associated with 
lower residential electricity prices in EU15 countries.  
The impact of regulatory reforms on prices has also been assessed in other network 
industries, reporting heterogeneous findings but pointing out to a limited, if not detrimental, role of 
privatizations per se. Brau et al. (2010) highlight that EU gas industry privatizations do not lead to 
benefits for consumers, but that some price lowering effects can be imputed to the softening of the 
entry legislation. Growitsch and Stronzik (2014) show that in the EU legal ownership unbundling of 
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natural gas transmission networks is associated with lower end-user prices while privatizations lead 
to a price increase. Finally, Bacchiocchi et al. (2011), focusing on EU telecommunications, report 
that regulation is associated with price reductions, while privatizations seems to play no significant 
role in explaining the price of international, national, local calls, and connection charges. 
 
Productivity, investment and other performance variables. As shown in Table 2, a second and very 
diffuse strand of the literature deals with the evaluation of the impact of reforms on productivity, 
investment decisions and various measures of the quality of the service provided. 
A first subset of studies focused on the impact of reforms on different macroeconomic 
aggregates. Prati et al. (2013) analyse the impact of trade, agriculture, network, and financial 
reforms on GDP growth for a sample of over ninety developing and developed countries. While 
reforms are positively correlated with growth, the association between liberalization in network 
industries (telecom and electricity) and growth is not statistically distinguishable from zero. 
Bacchiocchi et al. (2005, 2008), relying on time-series techniques, show that while UK 
privatizations had no long-run impact on output, public expenditure has been sustained by their 
proceeds, that have also temporarily boosted investments. A positive effect on investment was 
found also by Alesina et al. (2015), who show that entry liberalization and privatization in OECD 
countries had positive long-run effects on investment in the electricity, gas, water, communications, 
post, transport and storage sectors. On the other hand, Gugler et al. (2013) analyze the impact of 
regulations on aggregate investments in generation, distribution and transmission assets in 16 
European countries, providing a mixed evidence. Their results indicate that the establishment of a 
wholesale market or free choice of supplier boosts investment, while unbundling tends to decrease 
aggregate investment spending by adversely affecting the incumbent company. Consistently, Nardi 
(2012) shows that the correlation between ownership unbundling and investment in the electricity 
network is statistically indistinguishable from zero, once the lagged value of the dependent variable 
is included in the model. Grajek and Röller (2012), focusing on the telecommunications industry, 
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analyse the impact of entry regulation on investment decisions of over 70 fixed-line operators in 20 
European countries. They highlight that entry regulation discourages investment by both 
incumbents and entrants. Cambini and Rondi (2010) focus on the investment decisions of 23 energy 
utilities in five EU countries. They show that investment rate is lower under rate of return regulation 
than under incentive regulation.  
Concerning R&D expenditure, research analysed suggests a negative impact of 
liberalization reforms. Kim et al. (2012) analyse a panel of 70 electricity-generating firms located in 
15 OECD countries and show that entry liberalization is negatively associated with their level of 
R&D expenditure. Erdogdu (2013), focusing on a panel of 27 developed countries shows that 
reforms are negatively associated with government spending in energy R&D activities. 
Looking at environmental outcomes, two recent studies by Asane-Otoo (2016) and Clò et al. 
(2017) analyse the impact of reforms on greenhouse gas emissions and intensity. Asane-Otoo 
(2016) studies the relationship between restructuring policies and greenhouse gas emissions from 
the electricity sector in OECD countries and shows that emission intensity is negatively correlated 
with the degree of competition. In the case of 27 European countries, Clò et al. (2017) find that an 
increase in public ownership is associated with an improvement of environmental performance both 
before and after the introduction of the Emissions Trading System. 
Productivity issues are debated by Pompei (2013), who shows that, for a panel of 19 EU 
countries, the increased stringency of entry regulation is negatively associated with total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth in the electricity sector. Borghi et al. (2016), focusing on a panel dataset 
of electricity distribution firms operating in 16 European countries, show that in countries with poor 
quality of institutions, public ownership is associated with lower TFP, while where the quality of 
government is higher public ownership and TFP are positively correlated. Bottasso and Conti 
(2010) analyse the impact of motorway networks on output for a panel of twenty-one manufacturing 
and service sectors of eleven EU countries. They show that the elasticity of output with respect to 
motorway is lower in countries where the degree of entry barriers is higher. 
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As far as the quality of service is concerned, empirical evidence tends to confirm that 
reforms aiming to foster competition usually have beneficial effects, while a simple shift from 
public to private ownership did not lead to substantial gains. This is what emerges from the work of 
Zhang et al. (2008) which, using a panel of 36 developing countries, demonstrate that privatization 
and regulation do not lead to higher electricity generation and installed generation capacity, but  
competition is associated with performance improvements. Similar conclusions are drawn by Koo 
et al. (2013), which analyse the effect of private participation in the power service sector on the 
electric power transmission and distribution losses in 35 developing countries. They show that the 
efficiency of the power service is negatively correlated with private participation. Polemis (2016), 
focusing on 30 OECD countries, shows that the association between privatisation and electricity 
performance (labour productivity and installed capacity) is either negative or statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. Erdogdu (2011a), relying on a panel dataset of 92 developed and 
developing countries, shows that the efficiency boosting impact of reforms in the power sector is 
limited at best. Among the studies supporting a positive impact of reforms on service quality we 
include Zhang et al. (2005), which provide evidence that in developing countries electricity 
generation and installed generation capacity increase in the presence of an independent regulatory 
authority. Moreover, they show that the sequence of reforms matters: the introduction of 
competition before privatization leads to greater gains in terms of electricity generation and 
installed generation capacity. Polemis and Stengos (2017) focus on the electricity performance, as 
measured by capacity, generation, and productivity for 30 OECD countries. Using a static panel 
threshold fixed effect model, they split countries into two groups: liberalized and non-liberalized. 
For the latter group, they find that electricity performance is positively influenced by structural 
reforms. Nepal et al. (2010) study the association between ownership unbundling and quality of 
service for 29 electricity distribution networks in New Zealand, finding that duration and frequency 




Focusing on the telecommunication industry, Howard and Mazaheri (2009) show that 
neither privatizing, nor liberalizing the market spur the diffusion of information and communication 
technologies (ITCs). However, increasing the ‘de jure’ independence of the regulatory authority has 
beneficial effects for the diffusion of ITCs. Briglauer (2014) shows that for a panel of EU27 
countries the adoption of fiber-based broadband services is negatively correlated with the 
effectiveness of previous regulation. In a subsequent work the author shows that this negative 
correlation is explained by the fact that mandatory access regimes have a negative impact on 
investments and hence, indirectly, on fiber-based broadband adoption (Briglauer, 2015). Nardotto et 
al. (2015) show that in the UK local loop unbundling has increased the quality of service, as 
measured by the download speed of broadband internet connection. Belloc et al. (2013) analyse a 
panel of 22 European countries and show that liberalizations in the telecommunication industry are 
positively associated with the year-on-year change of market share of entrants, especially in the 
presence of an independent regulatory authority. 
 
Customer satisfaction. While the previous analyses focus on what can be thought to be the 
determinants of the quality of services, an alternative approach is to use consumers’ satisfaction 
surveys to directly measure perceived welfare changes (see e.g. Clifton et al., 2014). See Table 3. 
Florio and Poggi (2010) analyse how electricity and natural gas market reforms affect the 
probability of EU households struggling to pay bills. The authors show that while the probability of 
deprivation is positively affected by privatization, the effect of liberalization is not statistically 
distinguishable from zero. Fiorio and Florio (2011) show that consumers’ satisfaction is higher in 
countries where the market is liberalized and characterized by large public ownership of the 
electricity industry. Fiorio et al. (2013) show that local public transport users’ satisfaction is higher 
in cities where local transportation is managed by a monopolistic, integrated service organization. 
Ferrari et al. (2011) analyse the 2002 wave of the Eurobarometer survey with a multilevel random 
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effect model and show that customers’ satisfaction is negatively associated with privatization and 
liberalization in the telecommunication, energy and transport. 
 
4. Potential pitfalls and suggestions for the empirics of PFR 
Studies in Tables 1-3 rely on several PFR proxies. The process of building such variables is prone 
to several types of errors that can be grouped into three main categories: 
i. Conceptual errors; 
ii. Discretization, definition of orderings and metrics. 
iii. Aggregation errors. 
These three issues cause a broader class of empirical problems that goes under the header of 
measurement error. Moreover, given the nature of PFR proxies, interpretation of results requires 
some caution. This section discusses issues (i-iii), measurement error and provides suggestions for 
the interpretation of results in empirical analyses of PFR. 
 
Conceptual errors. When researchers look for variables that can approximate PFR, the risk of 
introducing conceptual errors is high. Although PFR proxies might not represent the analogous of 
signals in the RSG context, appropriate measures can be defined. Unbundling, for instance, can be 
thought as a categorical variable with an ordering going from full vertical integration, to complete 
unbundling. This is a relatively simplistic but consistent way of identifying the sequence of 
legislative acts that trigger the unbundling process. The proxy in fact identifies a new state of the 
economy, with accounting, legal and functional unbundling of a given industry. 
Interpretational and identification problems arise when the variable designed as a PFR indicator 
might also be the outcome of some macroeconomic shock. A case in point, is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index of concentration, or more simply reliance on the market share of the largest 
service provider in a country. 
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While these variables are in principle legitimate PFR proxies, their interpretation largely 
depends on the ingenuity of the researcher. The market share of, say, the largest electricity 
generator, is part of the policy and can be used as a PFR proxy when the regulator forces the 
incumbent to divest generation capacity. On the contrary, if the market share has changed in 
response to an exogenous technological shock that altered the optimal production plan not only for 
the incumbent, but for any firm in a sector, the validity of the PFR proxy is questionable. In this 
case, the technological shock is a confounding factor that causes an omitted variable bias and hence 
ultimately affects the evidence in favor or against the reform. 
Thus, if available, control variables should mitigate the omitted variable problem. These 
problems can also be addressed with a set of robustness checks, where alternative PFR proxies are 
used. 
 
Discretization, definition of orderings and metrics. Discretization is the process of converting a 
continuous variable into a discrete one. In the definition of any scoring system, criteria for building 
indicators starting from raw information are needed. When the underlying data are continuous, 
discretization may or may not have alternatives. In practice, most PFR variables, such as those in 
the ETCR or in the GCI databases, rely on a multidimensional, often discrete, scale. 
The reason for relying on discretized variables is due to the complexity of finding a unit of 
measure for PFR proxies. While discretization might apparently make the analysis easier, it has 
many drawbacks (Rucker et al., 2015). First, potentially useful variability is discarded; second, 
when the PFR is used as an explanatory variable, this loss of variability reduces the precision of in-
sample and out-of-sample predictions. In the extreme case of summarizing PFR with a dichotomic 
variable, there might be a substantial reduction in statistical power, that increases the chance of both 
type-I (i.e. false positive) and type-II error (i.e. false negative). Moreover, Lien and Balakrishnan 
(2005) show that dichotomization of the independent variable reduces goodness-of-fit and may 
increase or decrease the regression slope. Dichotomization leads also to interpretational issues. In 
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fact, using a dummy variable within a panel regression to measure, say an anti-monopoly policy, 
implies that competition increases by the same magnitude in all countries. Lastly, discretization is 
often arbitrary. In fact, original data often do not provide guidance for the design of intervals to be 
used for the definition of the scoring system. In such cases, collapsing scores into a dichotomic 
variable, or aggregating them in very wide brackets might be a viable strategy. Overall, there is a 
clear trade-off between statistical variability and discretization error. As it  can be seen in Tables 1-
3, several studies have pursued this approach, recoding the discrete PFR proxy into a dichotomic 
variable. See Bacchiocchi et al. (2015), Growitsch and Stronik (2014) and Nagayama (2007) among 
others. 
Discretization might also lead to issues in the definition of orderings and metrics. The first 
difficulty arises when there are several viable PFR, but according to an ideal path that goes from 
“less ambitious or advanced” to the “most ambitious or advanced” none of them represents a win-
win option. Coding such information is a very complicated task. A further issue arises when a 
categorical variable implies considering ordinal data as cardinal. In these cases, it may even be 
preferable to shrink the information into a dichotomic variable,  dramatically reducing the error, but 
also losing information and variability. Alternatively, as suggested by Fiorio and Florio (2011), one 
might check whether results critically depend on the cardinalisation adopted. 
 
Aggregation. There are usually no valid economic criteria to guide the aggregation of different PFR 
indicators using bottom-up approaches. For this reason, equal weights are often assigned to 
different aspects of PFR and upper-level indices are simple averages or sums of the lower-level 
variables. See Figure 1. This might bias estimates, affect inference and influence the evaluation of 
PFR; in fact, aggregate reform scores depend on arbitrarily selected equal weights. 
The problem can be either attenuated, by relying on data-reduction techniques, or 
completely avoided, by using only lower-level indicators. In this case, one PFR proxy will be 
interpreted as the variable of interest and the remaining as controls. Data-reduction techniques, such 
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as Principal Component Analysis, have been successfully used to calculate weights and synthetic 
PFR proxies in many settings (see e.g. Ferrari and Manzi, 2014; Florio and Poggi, 2010). However, 
if on the one hand they easily lead to a weighing scheme, on the other hand they are a-theoretical, 
leave no control to the analyst and are severely affected by the presence of outlying observations. A 
further alternative is to check the robustness of results to different weighting schemes with a 
random weights analysis (Koske et al., 2015). 
Besides problems related to the weighting scheme, the use of aggregate PFR measures in 
place of sub-indices lead to a loss of information, since  it does not allow to identify the effects 
resulting from distinct aspects of the regulation. 
 
Measurement error, ME. Measurement error (ME) identifies any deviation from the true value of 
variable that arises in the definitional or measurement stage (Asher, 1974) and therefore subsumes 
all the issues discussed so far. Mismeasurement is likely to be particularly severe in the case of PFR 
proxies since they rely on several non-standard data sources such as media coverage, legal and non-
legal acts and expert surveys. 
Misreporting by subjects, coding and other errors, such as those discussed above, are likely 
to inflate ME.
9
 As Blackwell et al. (2015) point out, also missing data are a limiting special case of 
mismeasurement that arises when there is no prior information about the true unobserved values of 
the variable of interest. Moreover, even in the presence of correctly measured variables, what we 
called “conceptual errors” are another source of ME. In fact, observed data often do not correspond 
to the exact concept the analyst is interested in (e.g. the use of years of schooling as a proxy for 
human capital). 
ME can be purely random or have both a casual and a nonrandom component. Nonrandom 
ME arises when the deviation from the true value of variable is systematically influenced by some 
                                                          
9




factors that introduce an upward or downward bias in the observations. Examples include the fact 
that data are often more accurate for some countries than for others (Albouy, 2012), or that long 
time series are more precisely measured in the present than in the past.
10
 A purely random white 
noise ME, is less worrisome than the nonrandom case for at least two reasons. First, econometric 
techniques for estimating its effects are better developed (see e.g. Asher, 1974; Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005). Second, contrarily to the nonrandom error case, it tends to average out in aggregate 
data, such as macroeconomic variables. This also explains why the literature on “error-in-variables” 
has developed in parallel with the increasing availability of micro-level cross-sectional and panel 
databases (Angrist and Krueger, 1999). 
There are many factors that determine the magnitude and the sign of the effect of ME on 
inferences, including: its nature (classical or non-classical, random or nonrandom), whether 
mismeasurement affects the dependent and/or the one, or more, independent variables, whether the 
variable is continuous or not, the nature of the model (bivariate or multivariate, linear or nonlinear), 
the nature of the dataset (cross-sectional or panel data). 
A benchmark case involves a continuous cross-sectional variable subject to classical ME of 
additive form. In this setting, instead of observing the true variable of interest, we observe a proxy 
that is the sum of the latent variable and a white noise error term that is independent of both the 
correctly measured variable and the regression error.
11
  
Depending on the aim of the analysis a given PFR proxy can be used either as the dependent 
or as an independent variable in a linear regression. Classical ME in the dependent variable leads to 
less precise least squares estimates, but does not introduce any bias (Angrist and Krueger, 1999). 
On the contrary, when there is a single regressor subject to classical ME, least squares estimates 
                                                          
10
 Gallop and Weschle (2017) provide a thorough discussion of the topic and develop a sensitivity analysis approach 
that can be used to conduct robustness analysis of inferences in the presence of nonrandom measurement error. 
11
 More formally, suppose that we are interested in yi =  xi
*
 + ui, but instead of observing the correctly measured 
variable xi
*




+ i, where i  (0 , v), and cov(xi
*
,i) = cov(ui,i) = 0. 
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will be downward biased and inconsistent. While adding more controls not contaminated by 
measurement issues, will decrease the magnitude of the attenuation bias (i.e. the bias toward zero 
coefficient of the mismeasured variable), the inconsistency problem remains and extends also to the 
coefficients of the other regressors, but for them the sign of the bias is not predictable. Similarly, if 
there is more than one explanatory variable measured with error, estimates are still inconsistent but 
the sign of the bias is not known a priori (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Lastly, going back to the 
case of a single mismeasured regressor, it can be shown that the inclusion of polynomial terms will 
generally inflate the size of the attenuation bias (Griliches and Ringstad, 1970). This case is relevant 
since researchers often include quadratic terms to capture nonlinearities relating PFR proxies with 
the outcome of interest (Alesina et al., 2005; Erdogdu, 2011). 
Given the prevalence of panel data analyses in the literature on the empirical evaluation of 
PFR it is legitimate to ask what happens if the reform proxy is contaminated by classical ME. 
Griliches and Hausman (1986) show that, since panel variables are typically positively correlated 
over time, the attenuation bias in  the fixed effect model is larger than in the cross-sectional case. 
Moreover, they show that relying on first-differenced data to remove fixed effects yields a larger 
attenuation bias than when running the regression on the level of variables. 
Classical ME is a useful benchmark, but the underlying assumptions are often not met by 
most widely used PFR proxies. For instance, variables in the ETCR database represent scores in a 
finite interval and are often transformed into a 0-1 dummy (see Tables 1-3). Clearly, neither scores, 
nor dummy variables are consistent with the classical ME assumptions. In fact, when the 
mismeasured variable is binary, ME cannot be independent of the correctly measured values of the 
variables. A dummy, can only be misclassified in one of two directions: a true “zero” classified as 
“one” or a true “one” classified as “zero”. The sign of the error depends on the true unobserved 
variable. Similarly, in the case of a score that can take on only some values in an interval. In a 
bivariate linear regression setting, a mismeasured dummy variable still leads to an attenuation bias, 
but generalizations of these results to other settings are not possible (Card, 1996). 
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In general, when moving from linear to non-linear models with classical or nonclassical ME 
(such as probit or Poisson specifications) characterization of its effects becomes much harder. 
Moreover, while instrumental variable estimation often provides a solution to the problem in linear 
models, it does not deliver consistent estimates in a nonlinear regression framework. In this setting, 
neither the linear, nor the nonlinear form of two-stage least squares estimator leads to consistent 
estimates of coefficients. See Bound et al. (2001), Hausman (2001) and Schennach (2016) for a 
survey of ME in nonlinear models. 
While there is no panacea for ME, visual inspection of data may sometimes help spotting 
outliers. In such cases, trimming (i.e. dropping observations with outlying values) and winsorizing 
(i.e. capping outlying data points) can be used to deal with outliers and various form of 
measurement error (Angrist and Krueger, 1999).
12
 Alternatively, if one is willing to make some 




Lastly, let us consider the ideal case when both the outcome variable and the PFR proxy are 
correctly measured. Should we omit other relevant variables because they might be measured with 
error? No, because we would simply substitute the bias due to ME with an “omitted variable bias”. 
Moreover, McCallum (1972) has shown that using a proxy of a latent variable will induce a smaller 
asymptotic bias than simply dropping the variable from the model. 
 
Interpretation of results. Within the GLM framework the interpretation of estimated coefficients, 
from a purely statistical point of view, is relatively straightforward. In fact, a key feature of GLM is 
that the conditional mean is of the single-index form, meaning that it is a nonlinear function of a 
linear combination of regressors and parameters, x′. When it is also a monotonic function, 
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 Lien and Balakrishnan (2005) discuss the relative merits of trimming and winsorizing for in-sample inference. 
13
 Since the literature on the topic is very diffuse, it cannot be surveyed here. The interested reader is referred to Bound 
et al. (2001), Hyslop and Imbens (2001), Schennach (2016) and references therein. 
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interpretation of regression results is further facilitated, even if the conditional mean is non-linear, 
as in the case of Logit and Probit models. More precisely, it can be shown that the ratio of 
coefficients for two different regressors equals the ratio of the marginal effects and that the sign of 
the coefficient gives the sign of the marginal effect (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
However, economic interpretation requires more caution. First, since any empirical 
specification omits some relevant, but possibly unavailable explanatory variable, the error term will 
pick-up the influence of such omissions; for this reason, estimates should not be given a causal 
reading. Rather, the estimate of coefficient associated with the PFR proxy represents the conditional 
correlation (or association) between the reform and the outcome variable of interest. 
In some cases, interpretational issues might arise even if there is an observable signal that 
allows the researcher to cast his analysis of PFR within the RSG theoretical framework. Assume 
that the PFR can be measured with a continuous time-series variable representing privatization 
proceeds for the Treasury. If the aim of the government is to reduce the country’s indebtedness by 
selling SOEs, then a positive estimated coefficient, showing that per-capita GDP increases for each 
additional euro of privatization proceeds, represents evidence in favour of the reform (see e.g. 
Bacchiocchi et al. 2005, 2008). Alternatively, suppose that the government aims at privatizing 
because private ownership is assumed to improve the efficiency of a strategic sector of the 
economy. In this case, since governments might even want to under-price SOEs, cash proceeds 
would not be an appropriate signal. An indicator variable might thus be a better PFR proxy (e.g. a 
dummy equal to one in the case of full public ownership, and zero otherwise). While reliance on 
discontinuous scores induces a loss of variability, it is nevertheless the best available information 
that the analyst can use, given the aim of the government. In this case the coefficient associated 
with the PFR variable should be read as an estimate of a structural break induced by the reform. 
It is useful to point out that the use of dummy variables is potentially subject to other issues. 
First, care should be taken when interpreting results when the dependent variable is log-
transformed. The coefficients of dummy variables cannot be given the interpretation of elasticities, 
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as in the case of continuous regressors. Second, in the case of a semi-logarithmic model, the 
percentage change in Y due to a discrete change in D from 0 to 1 is in fact given by p = 100 × 
(exp{c} – 1); however, using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimate of c, denoted as ?̂?, yields a 
biased estimator for p. A better solution is to rely on ?̂? = 100 × [exp{?̂? – 0.5 ?̂?(?̂?)} -1 ], where ?̂?(?̂?) 
is the OLS estimate of the variance of ?̂? (Kennedy, 1981). Among the surveyed study only Nepal et 
al. (2016) have addressed this issue as suggested. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper has reviewed the econometrics of policy framework reforms starting from the distinction 
between the theory of reform à la RSG and the problem of evaluating PFR when these cannot be 
read as a marginal change to a specific economic signal. 
This distinction clearly matters when carrying out empirical analyses of reforms in network 
industries, given that we have highlighted that PFR assessment is particularly prone to both 
methodological and interpretational errors. Moreover, the interpretation of estimated coefficients 
differs, because usually it is not meaningful to express them as marginal changes of the variable of 
interest, but rather as a transition from a policy regime to another. 
The punchline of our analysis is that even if going from the theory to empirics of PFR might 
be challenging, their empirical evaluation is an essential task for supporting policy making 
activities. In fact, the quantitative measurement of how social welfare responds to a change of 
circumstances, such as those implied by a PFR, is a not only at the core of applied welfare 
economics, but also a necessity, in that “evaluation of regulatory outcomes informs policy makers 
of successes, failures and the need for change or adjustment to regulation so that it continues to 
offer effective support for public policy goals” (OECD, 2010, p. 9). This point is stressed also by 
Parker and Kirkpatrick (2012) who highlight that “evidence on the outcomes of regulatory policies 
should help policymakers design regulatory measures that work better”. Further research is 
therefore needed to understand how to address the methodological issues discussed in this paper. 
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We have suggested how to avoid some potential pitfalls and reviewed some findings based on 
proxy variables of regulatory reforms. 
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Figure 1. Structure of the OECD’s Energy, Transport and Communications Regulation (ETCR) database. 
 
Notes: The ETCR index aggregates with equal weights indices for seven network sectors: telecom, electricity, gas, post, air transport, rail transport, 
and road transport. For each sector, there are up to four sub-indices that cover different dimensions of the reforms: entry regulation, public ownership, 
vertical integration and market regulation. We show the underlying questionnaire for the gas sector. Numbers are sector, topic and question weights 
used for aggregation purposes. 





Figure 2. Trends of ECTR reform indicators in EU-15 countries for the natural gas industry, 1975 – 2013. 
 
Notes: each panel shows one of the Indicators of Energy, Transport and Communications Regulation (ETCR), for individual EU15 countries (dots), 
the median value of the indicator (line) and the interquartile range, (IQR, shaded area). ECTR reform indicators score from 0 to 6. 
Source: authors’ calculation on data sourced from the ETCR database maintained by the OECD (Koske et al., 2015). 
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Table 1. Summary of empirical analyses of the effect of PFR in network industries: prices as dependent variable. 
Reference 
  Sample     
Dependent variable 
  Model   PFR proxy   
Results 





T  loc., int., nat. P, and 
connection charges 
 IV FE No  PO, MS, ARI log OECD-
ETCR 
 Mixed evidence: regulation reduces P, 
but technological and demand-side 





E  P households  FE No  ER, VI, PO, ARI Dummy, log OECD-
ETCR 
 Liberalization associated with lower P for 
the EU15 countries, but higher P for the 
NMS. 




E  P households  GMM Yes  VI, ER, PO, MS - OECD-
ETCR 
 Loosening entry regulation reduces P 
Erdogdu (2011b)  62 countries 1982-
09 
E  Electricity end use - 
fuel cost margin; 
Cross subsidy levels 
 FE, RE No  Composite reform 
score 
- various  No uniform pattern; impact of different 
reform steps varies greatly across 
countries. 




E  P households  FE, GMM Yes  ER, VI, PO and a 




 Public ownership associated with lower 
residential electricity prices 
Growitsch and 
Stronzik (2014)  












 Ownership [legal] unbundling 
(Privatization) associated with no change 
in [lower] (higher) P. 




E  P industrial users  FE, GMM Yes  Unbundling - various  Correlation between prices and 
restructuring is statistically nil 
Nagayama 
(2007) 




E  industrial and 
residential prices 
 OLS, FE, 
RE 




various  Coexistence of an independent regulator 
and unbundling associated with lower 








E   industrial and 
residential prices 
  FE, RE, IV No   liberalization score various   Liberalizations associated with price 
increases 
Notes: Industry: E = electricity; G = gas; W = water; T = telecommunications; Tr = transportation; various = more than one industry (jointly). Estimator: FE = Fixed effects; RE = random effects; GMM = generalized 
method of moments; AR(1) = Autoregressive model of order 1; LSDV = least-squares dummy variables; VECM = Vector error correction model. Dynamic: “yes” if lags of the dependent variable or autoregressive error 







Table 2. Summary of empirical analyses of the effect of PFR in network industries: Productivity, Investment and other 
performance variables 
Reference 
  Sample     
Dependent variable 
  Model   PFR proxy   
Results 
  Countries Period Industry     Estimator Dynamic   Description Transf. Source   




E, G, W, 
T, P, Tr 
  Investment/capital stock  FE, GMM Yes  ARI, ER, PO - OECD-ETCR  Deregulation, entry liberalization 
and privatization have a positive 





E  CO2, NOx, SOx 
intensity  
 FE, correlated 
RE 
No  ER, VI, PO Dummy OECD-ETCR  Emission intensity is negatively 









 various macroeconomic 
variables 
 VECM Yes  privatization proceeds - Various  Privatizations have no long-run 
impact on output; transitory impact 
on investment and the public 
expenditures  
Bacchiocchi 





 various macroeconomic 
variables 
 VECM Yes  privatization proceeds - Various  Privatizations have no long-run 
impact on output 
Belloc et al. 
(2013) 




T  Market share of new 
entrants 





 Liberalizations positively 
associated with year-on-year 
change of market share, especially 
in the presence of a regulatory 
authority. 
Borghi et al. 
(2016) 




E  total factor productivity  FE No  PO Dummy OECD-ETCR  Association between PO and 
productivity depends on the quality 
of government (QoG). Lower 
[higher] productivity with poor 
[high] QoG and PO 
Bottasso and 
Conti (2010). 




Tr  Production  GMM Yes  ER - OECD - 
ETCR 
 Elasticity of output with respect to 
motorway is found to be lower for 






T  Next-generation fiber 
based adoption  
 FE Yes  lines used by service-
based competitors as a 
share of total regulated 
wholesale broadband 
lines 
- various  Adoption of fiber-based broadband 
services negatively correlated with 






T  Next-generation fiber 
based investment  
 FE Yes  lines used by service-
based competitors as a 
share of total regulated 
wholesale broadband 
lines 
- various  Broadband access regulation 
negatively correlates with 








E, G  Investment rate  OLS, FE, GMM Yes  Incentive, rate of return 
regulation and PO 
dummy various  Investment rate is lower under rate 




Clò et al. 
(2017) 





E  CO2 emissions and 
intensity. 
 FE, RE No  PO, Market structure - OECD ETCR  Increase in public ownership 
associated with a reduction of both 
emissions and carbon intensity. 
Erdogdu 
(2011a) 
 92 countries 1982-
08 
E  Performance of 
electricity industry 
 FE, RE No  Composite reform score squared various  Reforms have a limited impact on 
the efficiency of the market. 
Erdogdu 
(2013) 




E  government spending in 
energy R&D 
 FE, RE No  Composite reform score - various  Reforms negatively associated with 
government R&D spending 
Grajek and 
Röller (2012) 




T  Tangible fixed assets as 
proxy for investment 
 system OLS and 
IV with FE 
Yes  ARI - Plaut 
Economics 
 Entry regulation discourages 
investment by incumbents and 
entrants 
Gugler et al. 
(2013) 















 Establishment of a wholesale 
market or free choice of supplier 





 154 countries 1990-
07 
T  Tech. Distribution 
indices for internet use 
and mobile phone 
adoption 
 FE + lagged dep. 
Var or AR(1) 
error term 







 Privatization and liberalization do 
not spur the diffusion information 
and communication technologies 
(ITCs). Regulatory separation is 
beneficial for diffusion of ITCs 
Kim et al. 
(2012) 





E  R&D expenditure  FE Tobit No  ER - OECD-ETCR 
and other 
sources 
 Entry liberalization associated with 
lower R&D 
Koo et al. 
(2013) 




E  power service efficiency 
(power transmission and 
distribution losses) 
 FE, RE, GEE No  Private participation log World Bank’s 
PPI database. 
 Private participation negatively 
correlated with efficiency. 




E  Quality of transmission 
network 
 corrected LSDV Yes  Unbundling scores various  Association between ownership 
unbundling and grid investments is 
not statistically significant. 
Nardotto et al. 
(2015) 
 UK 2009 T  Speed of connection  OLS No  Dummy = 1 if line 
served by LLU entrant 
- OfCom  Local loop unbundling (LLU) has 
increased average broadband speed. 
Nepal et al. 
(2016) 






E  quality of service  FE, RE No  ownership unbundling dummy various  Duration and frequency of supply 
interruptions in electricity 
distribution negatively associated 
with ownership unbundling  
Polemis 
(2016) 




E  indicators of electricity 
performance (capacity, 
generation, productivity) 
 FE, GMM Yes  ARI and others  OECD-ETCR  Association between privatisation 
and electricity performance (labour 
productivity and installed capacity) 
is either negative or statistically 
indistinguishable from zero 
Polemis and 
Stengos 




E  indicators of electricity 
performance (capacity, 
 panel threshold  no  ARI - OECD-ETCR  Reforms positively correlated with 
electricity performance in non-
39 
 
(2017) generation, productivity) liberalized countries 
Pompei 
(2013) 




E  TFP growth  GMM Yes  ARI, ER, VI, PO - OECD-ETCR  Increased stringency of entry 
regulation negatively impacts on 
productivity 
Prati et al. 
(2013) 






E, T  GDP growth  FE, GMM Yes  ARI - legislation and 
official 
documents 
 Association between liberalization 
and growth is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero 
Zhang et al. 
(2005) 




E  per-capita electricity 
generation and installed 
generation capacity 





dummies Various  Generation and generation capacity 
positively associated with the 
presence of an independent 
regulatory authority and by the 
introduction of competition before 
privatization  
Zhang et al. 
(2008) 




E  per-capita electricity 
generation and installed 
generation capacity 





Various  Privatization and regulation do not 
lead to higher electricity generation 
and installed generation capacity; 
competition associated with 
performance improvements 
Notes: Industry: E = electricity; G = gas; W = water; T = telecommunications; Tr = transportation; various = more than one industry (jointly). Estimator: FE = Fixed effects; RE = random effects; GMM = generalized 
method of moments; AR(1) = Autoregressive model of order 1; LSDV = least-squares dummy variables; VECM = Vector error correction model. Dynamic: “yes” if lags of the dependent variable or autoregressive error 













Table 3. Summary of empirical analyses of the effect of PFR in network industries: customers' satisfaction as dependent variable 
Reference 
  Sample     
Dependent 
variable 
  Model   PFR proxy   
Results 
  Countries Period Industry     Estimator Dynamic   Description Transf. Source   
Ferrari et al. 
(2011) 
 over 16000 
citizens in EU 
countries 




 RE No  ARI - OECD - 
ETCR 
 Customers’ satisfaction is negatively 




 EU15 2000, 
2002, 
2004 
E  Consumers' 
satisfaction 
 Probit Yes, lagged 
ETCR data 
 ER, PO and a 




 Satisfaction for the price paid is higher when 
there are bot PO and liberalization 
Fiorio et al. 
(2013) 
 over 14000 
citizens in 33 
European cities 
2009 Tr  Consumers' 
satisfaction 
 Probit No  PO, Deregulation categorical various  Satisfaction higher in cities where local 
transportation is managed by a monopolistic, 
integrated service organization 
Florio and 
Poggi (2010) 




E, G  Energy 
deprivation 
 Static and 
dynamic 
Probit 
Yes  ER, VI, PO and a 




 Probability of deprivation is positively 
affected by privatization; the effect of 
liberalization is not statistically 
distinguishable from zero 
Notes: Industry: E = electricity; G = gas; W = water; T = telecommunications; Tr = transportation; various = more than one industry (jointly). Estimator: FE = Fixed effects; RE = random effects; GMM = generalized 
method of moments; AR(1) = Autoregressive model of order 1; LSDV = least-squares dummy variables; VECM = Vector error correction model. Dynamic: “yes” if lags of the dependent variable or autoregressive error 
terms are included. PFR proxy description:  ARI = aggregate regulatory index (typically the sample average of underlying PFR proxies); PO = public ownership; ER = Entry regulation; VI = vertical integration; MS = 
market share. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
